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The vision of nomadic computing with its ubiquitous access has stimulated much interest in the mobile ad hoc
networking (MANET) technology. However, its proliferation strongly depends on the availability of security provi-
sions, among other factors. In the open, collaborative MANET environment, practically any node can maliciously or
selﬁshly disrupt and deny communication of other nodes. In this paper, we propose the secure message transmission
(SMT) protocol to safeguard the data transmission against arbitrary malicious behavior of network nodes. SMT is a
lightweight, yet very eﬀective, protocol that can operate solely in an end-to-end manner. It exploits the redundancy of
multi-path routing and adapts its operation to remain eﬃcient and eﬀective even in highly adverse environments. SMT
is capable of delivering up to 83% more data messages than a protocol that does not secure the data transmission.
Moreover, SMT achieves up to 65% lower end-to-end delays and up to 80% lower delay variability, compared with an
alternative single-path protocol––a secure data forwarding protocol, which we term secure single path (SSP) protocol.
Thus, SMT is better suited to support quality of service for real-time communications in the ad hoc networking en-
vironment. The security of data transmission is achieved without restrictive assumptions on the network nodes trust
and network membership, without the use of intrusion detection schemes, and at the expense of moderate multi-path
transmission overhead only.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Secure communication, an important aspect of
any networking environment, is an especially sig-
niﬁcant challenge in ad hoc networks. The MA-
NET paradigm seeks to enable communication
across networks whose topology and membership
can change frequently. Its distinctive feature is that
network nodes need to collaborate with their peers* Corresponding author.
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an environment, malicious or selﬁsh nodes can
disrupt or even deny the communications of po-
tentially any node within the ad hoc networking
domain. This is so, exactly because every node in
the network is not only entitled, but is in fact re-
quired, to assist in the network establishment, the
network maintenance, and the network operation.
The challenge in addressing these security vul-
nerabilities is due to the above particular MANET
characteristics and due to the fact that traditional
security mechanisms may be inapplicable here.
First, the practically invisible or non-existent ad-
ministrative boundaries encumber the a priori
classiﬁcation of a subset of nodes as trusted.ed.
1 Clearly, an adversary could hide its malicious behavior for
a long period of time and strike at the least expected time––it
would be impossible to discover such an adversary prior to its
attack.
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vironment, the determination of the nodes that can
be trusted based on monitoring of the nodes in-
teractions with the rest of the network can be very
diﬃcult, and the overhead and especially the delay
to make such inferences can be prohibitively large.
The communication in mobile ad hoc networks
comprises two phases, the route discovery and the
data transmission. In an adverse environment, both
phases are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. First,
adversaries can disrupt the route discovery by
impersonating the destination, by responding with
stale or corrupted routing information, or by dis-
seminating forged control traﬃc. This way, at-
tackers can obstruct the propagation of legitimate
route control traﬃc and adversely inﬂuence the
topological knowledge of benign nodes. However,
adversaries can also disrupt the data transmission
phase and, thus, incur signiﬁcant data loss by
tampering with, fraudulently redirecting, or even
dropping data traﬃc or injecting forged data
packets.
To provide comprehensive security, both phases
of MANET communication must be safeguarded.
It is noteworthy that secure routing protocols,
which ensure the correctness of the discovered
topology information, cannot by themselves en-
sure the secure and undisrupted delivery of trans-
mitted data. This is so, since adversaries could
abide with the route discovery and place them-
selves on utilized routes. But then, they could
tamper with the in-transit data in an arbitrary
manner and degrade the network operation.
Upper layer mechanisms, such as reliable
transport protocols, or mechanisms currently as-
sumed by the MANET routing protocols, such as
reliable data link or acknowledged routing, cannot
cope with malicious disruptions of the data
transmission. In fact, the communicating nodes
may be easily deceived for relatively long periods
of time, thinking that the data ﬂow is undisrupted,
while no actual communication takes place.
One way to counter security attacks would be to
cryptographically protect and authenticate all
control and data traﬃc. But to accomplish this,
nodes would have to have the means to establish
the necessary trust relationships with each and
every peer they are transiently associated with,including nodes that just forward their data. Even
if this were feasible, such cryptographic protection
cannot be eﬀective against denial of service at-
tacks, with adversaries simply discarding data
packets.
To secure the data transmission phase, we pre-
sent here the secure message transmission (SMT)
protocol, a secure end-to-end data forwarding
protocol tailored to the MANET communication
requirements. SMT safeguards the communication
across an unknown, frequently changing network
in the presence of adversaries that exhibit arbitrary
malicious behavior. We emphasize that the goal of
SMT is not to securely discover routes in the net-
work––the security of this phase should be
achieved by protocols such as the secure routing
protocol (SRP) [1,2]. The goal of SMT is to ensure
secure data forwarding, after the discovery of
routes between the source and the destination has
been already performed. In other words, SMT
assumes that there is a protocol that discovers
routes in the ad hoc network, although such dis-
covered routes may not be free of malicious
nodes. 1 Then, the goal of SMT is to ensure
routing over such routes, in spite of the presence of
such adversaries. In this sense, SMT is a protocol
that allows tolerating rather than detecting and
isolating malicious nodes.
In the rest of paper, we ﬁrst provide an over-
view of SMT and then describe its operation in
Section 3. The performance evaluation of SMT
through simulation experiments that compare
SMT to alternative protocols follows. Next, we
brieﬂy present related work. In Section 6, we
provide a discussion and describe future work,
before we conclude.2. Overview of SMT
The SMT protocol safeguards pair-wise com-
munication across an unknown frequently chang-
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ies. It combines four elements: end-to-end secure
and robust feedback mechanism, dispersion of the
transmitted data, simultaneous usage of multiple
paths, and adaptation to the network changing
conditions. Its goal is to promptly detect and tol-
erate compromised transmissions, while adapting
its operation to provide secure data forwarding
with low delays. We especially emphasize the low-
delay characteristic of SMT, as we believe that one
of the main applications of SMT is in support of
quality of service (QoS) for real-time traﬃc. 2
SMT requires a security association (SA) only
between the two end communicating nodes, the
source and the destination. Since a pair of nodes
chooses to employ a secure communication
scheme, their ability to authenticate each other is
indispensable. The trust relationship can be in-
stantiated, for example, by the knowledge of the
public key of the other communicating end. 3
However, none of the end nodes needs to be se-
curely associated with any of the remaining net-
work nodes. As a result, SMT does not require
cryptographic operations at these intermediate
nodes.
With SMT, at any particular time, the two
communicating end nodes make use of a set of
diverse, preferably node disjoint paths that are
deemed valid at that time. We refer to such a set of
paths as the active path set (APS). The source ﬁrst
invokes the underlying route discovery protocol,
updates its network topology view, and then de-
termines the initial APS for communication with
the speciﬁc destination.
With a set of routes at hand, the source dis-
perses each outgoing message into a number of
pieces. At the source, the dispersion, based on the
algorithm in [3], introduces redundancy and en-
codes the outgoing messages, as described in Sec-2 SMT, due to its operation over multiple paths, allows
elimination of retransmissions of packets that were lost due to
adversarial nodes.
3 The two nodes can negotiate a shared secret key, e.g., via
the elliptic curve Diﬃe–Hellman algorithm [17,19] and then,
using the SA, verify that the principal that participated in the
exchange was indeed the trusted node. For the rest of the
discussion, we assume the existence of a shared secret key KS;T .tion 3.2. At the destination, a dispersed message is
successfully reconstructed, provided that suﬃ-
ciently many pieces are received. In other words,
the message dispersion ensures successful recep-
tion even if a fraction of the message pieces is lost
or corrupted, either due to the existence of mali-
cious nodes, or due to the unavailability of routes
(e.g., breakage of a route as a result of nodes
mobility).
Each dispersed piece is transmitted across a
diﬀerent route and carries a message authentica-
tion code (MAC) [4], so that the destination can
verify its integrity and the authenticity of its origin.
The destination validates the incoming pieces and
acknowledges the successfully received ones
through a feedback back to the source.
The feedback mechanism is also secure and
fault tolerant: It is cryptographically protected and
dispersed as well. This way, the source receives
authentic feedback that explicitly speciﬁes the
pieces that were received by the destination. A
successfully received piece implies that the corre-
sponding route is operational, 4 while a failure is a
strong indication that the route is either broken or
compromised.
While transmitting across the APS, the source
updates the rating of the APS paths. For each
successful or failed piece, the rating of the corre-
sponding path is increased or decreased, respec-
tively, as we explain in Section 3.3. A path is
discarded once it is deemed failed and a precaution
is taken not to use the same path, if it is discovered
again within some time after it has been discarded.
While continuously assessing the quality of the
utilized paths, the protocol adapts its operation
based on the feedback it receives from the trusted
destination. Based on its interaction with the net-
work, the protocol adjusts its conﬁguration to re-
main eﬀective in highly adverse environments and
eﬃcient in relatively benign conditions.
If a suﬃcient number of pieces are received at
the destination, the destination proceeds to recon-
struct the message. Otherwise, if a dispersed mes-
sage cannot be reconstructed at the destination,4 Although this does not ensure that the path is free of
malicious nodes.
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by the source. The number of retransmissions is
limited to Retrymax per serviced message.
An illustrative example of a single message
transmission is shown in Fig. 1. The sender dis-
perses the encoded message into four packets, so
that any three out of the four packets are suﬃcient
for successful reconstruction of the original mes-
sage. The four packets are routed over four dis-
joint paths and two of them arrive intact at the
receiver. The remaining two packets are compro-
mised by malicious nodes lying on the corre-
sponding paths; for example, one packet is
dropped, and one (dashed arrow) is modiﬁed.
The receiver extracts the information from the
ﬁrst incoming validated packet and waits for
subsequent packets, while setting a reception
timer. When the fourth packet arrives, the cryp-
tographic integrity check reveals the data tam-
pering and the packet is rejected. At the expiration
of the timer, the receiver generates an acknowl-
edgement reporting the two successfully received
packets and feedbacks the acknowledgment across
the two operational paths.
It is suﬃcient for the sender to receive and
cryptographically validate only one acknowledge-
ment, ignoring duplicates. The two failing paths
are discarded and the two missing pieces are then
retransmitted over other paths; one of the two
packets is now lost, for example, because of in-
termittent malicious behavior, or a benign path
breakage. The receiver acknowledges the success-
ful reception immediately, before the timer expi-
ration, since an adequate number of packets (three
out of four) have been received. Note that afterTime
Source
Destination
Dispersed
Message
Re-transmit
ACK
timer timer
Dispersed
ACK
Fig. 1. Simple example of the SMT protocol.transmission of the ﬁrst packet, the sender sets a
retransmission timer, so that total loss of all the
message pieces or of all the acknowledgments can
be detected.3. Details of SMT operation
3.1. Determination of the APS
SMT can operate with any underlying routing
protocol, 5 although the use of a secure protocol is
essential to reap the beneﬁts of SMT. Otherwise,
adversaries could disable communication by con-
tinuously providing false routing information.
SMT is independent of the route discovery pro-
cess––for example, it can operate in conjunction
with a reactive or a proactive protocol. However,
the knowledge of the actual nodal connectivity and
the use of source routing result in two advantages.
First, it is possible for the sender to implement an
arbitrary path selection algorithm in order to in-
crease the reliability of the data transmission. For
example, the path selection algorithm could in-
corporate subjective criteria, such as nodes to be
explicitly included or excluded from the APS.
Second, no discretion on route decisions is left to
intermediate nodes, in order to enhance the ro-
bustness of the protocol. This way, the communi-
cating end nodes can explicitly correlate the failed
or successful transmissions with the corresponding
routes. As a result, non-operational and possibly
compromised routes are unambiguously detected
at the source node, so that newly determined
routes can be entirely diﬀerent from previously
utilized and discarded routes. For the rest of the
paper, we assume that a secure routing protocol,
such as SRP [1,2] or SLSP [5], provides a number
of routes to SMT, every time the route discovery
protocol is executed. The source constructs an
APS of k node-disjoint paths, depending on the
actual node connectivity of its topology view.5 As long as the routing protocol is capable of discovering
multiple routes.
Fig. 2. (a) Example of an encoding of a message: a message of
F bytes is segmented into pieces, which are the columns of
matrix B, with L ¼ FS=M . Matrix A holds N random vectors,
and W is the resultant dispersed message, with its pieces as rows
of matrix W . (Note that bytes/characters are treated as inte-
gers.) (b) Example of the IDA operation: all data values are
8-bit integers, shown in their hexadecimal representation.
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The information dispersal scheme is based on
Rabins algorithm [3], which acts in essence as an
erasure code: It adds limited redundancy to the
data to allow recovery from a number of faults.
The message and the redundancy are divided into
a number of pieces, so that even a partial reception
can lead to the successful reconstruction of the
message at the receiver. In principle, the encoding
(and dispersion) allows the reconstruction of the
original message with successful reception of any
M out of N transmitted pieces. The ratio r ¼ N=M
is termed the redundancy factor.
Messages, i.e., raw data, can be viewed as a
stream of integers, or m-bit characters, so that each
integer is in the [0 . . . 2m  1] range. It suﬃces to
select a prime number p > 2m  1, so that all en-
coding and decoding operations are performed in
a ﬁnite ﬁeld mod p. 6 Initially, N random M-vec-
tors, organized as rows faig of matrix A, are se-
lected, with any M of them linearly independent.
These ai vectors can be constructed by selecting N
diﬀerent elements ui of the ﬁnite ﬁeld and set
ai ¼ ½1; ui; . . . ; uM1i , 16 i6N , and N < p. The
vectors of matrix A should be selected from a pre-
computed set used by both ends, which we assume
is agreed upon as part of the SA establishment
process.
The encoding of a message ﬁrst segments the
original message of length FS into L sequences of
characters, each of length M , with padding if
necessary. The segments of the original message
are denoted by s1; s2; . . . ; sL and they are arranged
as columns of the array B, as illustrated on Fig.
2(a). Then, each piece wi of the dispersed message
is created as a character sequence of length L: To
do so, the original message segments are multiplied
by the corresponding random vector ai, and the
resultant piece is wi ¼ ½ais1; ais2; . . . ; aisL.6 The operations can be performed in ﬁnite ﬁelds of the form
GF ð2mÞ, to avoid the use of excessive bits per represented
character. For example, if 8-bit characters are used, the use of
p ¼ 257 imposes an excess of one bit per character, while
GF ð28Þ suﬃces, without the excess [3,18].Upon reception of any M pieces, the original
message can be reconstructed. 7 Let v1; v2; . . . ; vM
denote the M pieces used for reconstruction, which
are in fact a subset of the N transmitted pieces, wi.
Each one of the vi pieces corresponds to one of
the ai vectors, which are, by deﬁnition, linearly7 In case more than M pieces are received, the ﬁrst M could
be used for the reconstruction of the message, for eﬃciency
reasons. Another option would be to use the M most credible
pieces, if soft-detection decoding is used.
8 The initial value is set to rsð0Þ ¼ d  ðrmaxs  rthrs Þ, with
0 < d < 1.
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vectors is thus invertible. To reconstruct the orig-
inal message, it suﬃces to multiply each of the vi
pieces by the inverse of A0. If vi are the rows of an
M  L array, W 0, the original message reconstruc-
tion can be written as B ¼ ½A01  W 0ML.
Fig. 2(b) provides an illustrative example of the
IDA operation, continuing the example in Fig. 1.
N ¼ 4 pieces are sent and M ¼ 3 pieces are re-
ceived and used in the message reconstruction at
the receiver, i.e., r ¼ 4=3. Raw data are treated as
bytes and take values between 0 and 255. The
encoding and decoding operations are performed
in the GF ð28Þ ﬁnite ﬁeld. Matrix A is created based
on the (randomly) selected ui ¼ f69; 125; 176; 91g,
and it is shown in Fig. 2(b: i). The message has size
FS ¼ 64 bytes and it is padded with
PD ¼ M  dFS=Me  FS bytes. It is segmented into
L ¼ ðFS þ PDÞ=M segments, arranged as the col-
umns of the array B shown in Fig. 2(b: ii). The
encoded message W is shown in Fig. 2(b: iii), with
each row of the array being one piece to be dis-
persed through the network.
Now, for instance, let the w4 piece be the one
that is never received by the destination. The
message pieces available to the receiver are the
rows of matrix W 0 shown on Fig. 2(b: iv). Matrix
A0 (Fig. 2(b: v)) holds the faig vectors that corre-
spond to the received pieces, and the reconstructed
message, shown on Fig. 2(b: vi), is identical to the
transmitted one.
3.3. APS adaptation
As the source transmits the dispersed messages
across the APS, it updates the ratings of the uti-
lized paths based on the feedback (or its absence)
provided by the destination. Each path is associ-
ated with two ratings: a short-term and a long-
term rating. The short-term rating, rs, is decreased
by a constant a each time a failed transmission is
reported, and it is increased by a constant b for
each successful reception. The long-term rating, rl,
is a fraction of successfully received (and in fact,
acknowledged) pieces over the total number of
pieces transmitted across the route. If either rs, or
rl, or both drop below a threshold value, rthrs and
rthrl respectively, the corresponding path is dis-carded. Both thresholds are protocol selectable
parameters.
The rs rating takes values in the interval
I ¼ ½rthrs ; rmaxs  interval, with rthrs P 0, rmaxs the max-
imum value for the path rating, and rsð0Þ its initial
rating, assigned when a path is ﬁrst added to the
APS. 8 The constants a and b take values in the
ð0; rmaxs  interval. After the ith transmission across
a path that is not deemed failed yet, its rating is
updated:
rsðiÞ ¼
maxfrsði 1Þ  a; rthrs g;
if a piece is lost;
minfrsði 1Þ þ b; rmaxs g;
if a piece is received:
8><
>:
ð1Þ
If i transmissions across a path include s suc-
cessfully received (thus acknowledged) pieces and l
lost ones, then i ¼ sþ l, with s, l integers. If rsðiÞ
has already reached the maximum value, then,
additional successive acknowledged (successful)
pieces do not increase the rating any further. If s0
denotes the number of such successful receptions,
and s1 denotes the number of successful receptions
while the path rating is below rmaxs , then
s ¼ s0 þ s1. Thus, the rating of the path can be
written as
rsðiÞ ¼ rsð0Þ þ bs1  al: ð2Þ
For any route that is not deemed failed yet,
rsðiÞP rthrs . Then, from Eq. (2) we get that
s1b laP rthrs  rsð0Þ. If we set d ¼ rsð0Þ
rthrs P 0, we can rewrite the previous inequality as
bs1  alþ dP 0 ð20 Þ
where s1 and l take integer values that are not si-
multaneously zero.
The rating mechanism should guarantee that a
non-operational route is promptly discarded, in-
dependently of its prior history. In other words,
the detection of route failures should be fast even
for routes that were fully operational for a long
period of time and their rating reached its maxi-
mum allowed value, rmaxs . In that case, the failed
route would be discarded after at most
9 Care should be taken in the selection of b, since very small
b values will cause very slow reinstatement of paths after
experiencing short and transient losses.
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sions. The value of f can be regulated by selecting,
for example, an appropriate value for the constant
a. If f is low (e.g. 1), a transient failure will result
in discarding an operational path, while a high f
may allow repeated transmissions over a broken
path and thus overhead before determining the
path breakage.
Nevertheless, an adversary lying on a path may
select an arbitrary attack pattern to disrupt the
transmissions without letting rsðiÞ to drop below
rthrs . This way, the attacker can retain its ability to
degrade the network operation, trying to maximize
the number of dropped data packets, while the
route will still be considered operational. For ex-
ample, intuitively, the attacker would be most ef-
fective if it never allows the reception of data
pieces when the path rating is equal to rmaxs (i.e.,
s0 ¼ 0).
In order to determine the eﬀectiveness of the
path rating mechanism, we deﬁne the bandwidth
loss over a path, BWL, as the fraction of packets
that an adversary can discard or corrupt without
the route determined to be non-operational (i.e.,
Eq. (20) holds for the route). Based on the pre-
vious discussion, the BWL for i transmissions (s
successful and l failed ones) across a single path
is
BWL ¼ l
i
¼ l
sþ l : ð3Þ
For any number of successfully received packets
s6 i, that the attacker allowed to reach the desti-
nation, the attacker can select any l packets to
drop without being detected. Clearly, l6 i s and
from Eq. (20), (with a 6¼ 0, b 6¼ 0) l will be
l6 b
a
s

þ d
b

: ð4Þ
Thus, the maximum number of dropped packets is
l ¼ b
a
s

þ d
b

: ð40 Þ
The BWL would be maximized when l is maxi-
mized (l ¼ l). As the number of transmissions
increases and, thus, s increases, we get from Eqs.
(40) and (3):BWL6BWL ¼ lim
s!þ1
l
sþ l ¼
b
aþ b : ð5Þ
The bound for data loss provided in Eq. (5) is
independent of the attack pattern. Thus, a judi-
cious selection of a and b can reduce the impact of
an intelligent adversary that stays undetected.
Clearly, it is necessary that a is not zero (a > 0);
otherwise, the attacker would have full control
over a path (BWL ¼ 1). Furthermore, it must
hold that a > b in order to keep BWL < 0:5; in
fact, the smaller b is compared to a, the lower
BWL will be. 9
Depending on the selection of values for a and
b, the loss of data could be signiﬁcant, especially if
the utilized route that contains the intelligent at-
tacker is a long-lived one. An additional line of
defense is provided by rl, whose threshold can be
set to detect a possible abuse of the rs rating. If the
running average of delivered over transmitted
pieces drops below an acceptable threshold, then
the path is discarded independently of the rs rat-
ing. For example, if b=a ¼ 1=10, an adversary
could discard up to 9% of the transmitted packets;
then, rthrl could be set equal to 95% for instance to
ensure lower loss of data.
The mechanisms for updating both the rs and rl
are necessary, because we cannot make any as-
sumption on the attack pattern. An adversary
could be latent for a long period, exhibiting fully
benign behavior, and be activated exactly when it
can cause the greatest harm. Or it could behave
maliciously in an intermittent and apparently
pseudorandom manner. SMT can mitigate such
malicious behavior since it does not rely on ‘‘test
packets’’ or a ‘‘testing period’’ to assess the path
security. Such an approach would fail, since the
communicating nodes can be easily misled to deem
all paths as ‘‘safe’’. For instance, if the adversary
can distinguish the test packets, it could forward
them and later tamper with the actual data. If test
packets are indistinguishable, then, the adversary
only needs to forward a number of packets until
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attack. 10 And the more extensive the testing pe-
riod, the higher the imposed transmission over-
head and delay, without any guarantee that the
‘‘security’’ of the paths could be determined and
malicious nodes could be isolated.
In contrast, while SMT transmits data, it pro-
vides eﬀective probing at a low-cost due to the
simultaneous routing across multiple routes. In
other words, the actual routing across APS allows
determination of the paths condition. The trans-
mission of a piece across a low-rated path, al-
though it may appear as a costly operation, can be,
indeed, beneﬁcial. Due to the message dispersion,
the source can easily tolerate loss of a piece, if
indeed the path is not operational. At the same
time, if the reduction of the rating was due to
transient faults (either malicious or benign), the
successfully received piece will still contribute to
the reconstruction of the message and, possibly, to
the reinstatement of the path rating.
3.4. Protocol autoconﬁguration
The primary goal of the protocol adaptation is
to maximize its eﬀectiveness in highly adverse en-
vironments. An obvious solution would be for the
source to discover and maintain a suﬃciently high
number of paths in order for the dispersed message
to be successfully received. However, the APS se-
lection is coupled to the rest of the protocol pa-
rameters, the network environment, and even to
the requirements of the supported application.
In particular, the protocol adaptation can be
viewed as the result of the interplay among the
following parameters: (i) K, the number of utilized
APS paths, (ii) k, the ðS; T Þ-connectivity, i.e., the
maximum number of S ! T node disjoint paths
from the source (S) to the destination (T ), (iii) r,
the redundancy factor of the information dis-10 If the content of the packets can be analyzed, the attack
could be selective, targeting packets of high importance. The
selection of the packets to corrupt could depend on the
knowledge of the employed protocols and the supported
applications or could be purely subjective. For example, the
loss of the last message of a multi-round interactive protocol
has a severe impact.persal, and (iv) x, the (maximum) number of ma-
licious nodes.
If M out of N transmitted packets are required
for successful reception then r ¼ N=M . For an
allocation of one piece per path, K should be at
least N , and the required number of packets is
M ¼ K=r. Equivalently, the higher x is, the larger
K should be for a ﬁxed r, in order to tolerate a
higher number of faults. The condition for suc-
cessful reception, showing the relationship among
the parameter values, is
x6 dK  ð1 r1Þe: ð6Þ
If the adversarial nodes constitute a cut of cardi-
nality CX , the result could be either a partitioned
network (if CX P k) as seen by S and T , or a mere
failure to reconstruct the message at the receiver (if
k > CX P k M).
The misbehavior pattern of the adversaries is an
additional factor that aﬀects the operation of the
protocol; if, ideally, the behavior of the adversary
could be predicted, the protocol could be opti-
mally reconﬁgured. However, the behavior of the
attacker can be arbitrary and time dependent.
Moreover, the two communicating nodes will
have, in general, no a priori knowledge about the
security of the network or the trustworthiness of
the rest of the nodes. 11 Since the source has no
initial knowledge of the security of the individual
paths or nodes, any node on a determined path
can be malicious and disrupt the protocol opera-
tion. Alternatively, we can consider initially any
single node as equally probable to be an adversary.
The protocol starts with selecting an APS of K
shortest (in terms of hops) paths [22]. Without
having the opportunity to ‘‘probe’’ the paths and
assuming that all nodes are equally probable to be
malicious, selecting the shortest paths is equivalent
to the selection of the most secure paths. The
shorter a path, the fewer the intermediate nodes,
and thus the lower the probability that the path
will be compromised.11 This is clearly true for an open, civilian network with
disparate nodes collaborating only for the provision of basic
networking services. But it could be true even for a battleﬁeld
network, if a number of initially trusted nodes are hijacked.
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of paths, the chances of successful message re-
construction increase as the redundancy factor
increases. Thus, the use of a higher redundancy
factor could be particularly useful during the ini-
tial transmissions across a newly determined APS,
when the uncertainty on the quality of the routes is
higher, or, when the protocol operates in a highly
adverse environment with a limited number of
paths. After a number of such costly transmis-
sions, the source can switch to a smaller number of
paths and a lower redundancy factor. The use of
all available paths, especially if it were combined
with high redundancy, may not be desirable at all
times. It can introduce unnecessary network
overhead, especially when the nodes operate in a
low-risk environment.
For eﬃcient operation of the protocol without
compromising its eﬀectiveness, we propose the
following method. The source determines an APS
of K node disjoint paths and calculates an estimate
pi, the probability that each path is operational,
for each of the APS paths. The calculation of such
estimates is beyond the scope of this paper and can
be done in a number of alternative ways, based on
the interaction of the nodes with the network. 12
We discuss alternative ways in Section 6. For each
message transmission, one piece is assigned to each
of the paths, which implies that all possible values
of r are easy to determine. For an APS of K paths,
the source can select to utilize i ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . . ; k
paths. If i paths are utilized, then at most i pieces
can be sent; i.e., N must be equal to i. Conse-
quently, r can take one of the following values:
i=1; i=2; . . . ; i=M ; . . . ; i=i ¼ 1. In total, there are
exactly k2=2 feasible values for r and they can be
pre-calculated.
For a particular combination of r and i and the
estimated values for pi, it is a straightforward ex-
ercise to calculate the probability that a transmis-12 One possibility is for SMT to approximate pi based on rl,
the fraction of delivered over transmitted pieces. Clearly, the
higher the number of pieces transmitted across a given path, the
more meaningful this approximation is. However, we must
emphasize that an increasing number of samples cannot provide
any additional guarantee that the path will remain operational
in the future.sion is successful. The calculation is based on the
assumption of disjointness of routes, which allows
us to assume that the route failures are indepen-
dent. The event of a successful message recon-
struction is complementary to the event that any
iM þ 1 ¼ i i=r þ 1 paths or more fail, and the
sought probability can be calculated numerically,
or with the help of an approximation [6].
The source can then select the required redun-
dancy and the number of paths in the following
way. If PGOAL is the required probability of suc-
cessful packet delivery (for example, as determined
by the application layer), then the source can select
i and r that yield a value equal to PGOAL, or the
closest possible if this cannot be achieved.
Note that similar probabilities of success can be
achieved with diﬀerent combinations of i and r.
One way to select this pair of values is to determine
ﬁrst the least number of paths Kmin that are nec-
essary to achieve PGOAL, and, then, select the
minimum r among the feasible values, given Kmin.
Essentially, this is equivalent to searching ﬁrst
along the diagonal of the (i; r) matrix of the cal-
culated probabilities of success and then searching
along the selected row.
Finally, we note that a high r can compensate
for low K to some extent, while a low r may yield a
low probability of success even if K is very high.
On one hand, it is not possible to do anything
more than maximally dispersing the message(s)
when a small-size APS limits the operation of the
protocol and, on the other hand, it is preferable to
utilize fewer paths and higher redundancy, when
paths are long or similarly when their probabilities
of operation are low.4. Performance evaluation
Our experiments verify that the proposed pro-
tocol can, indeed, successfully cope with a high
number of adversaries, while operating only in an
end-to-end manner. SMT can deliver successfully
more than twice the number of packets delivered
by a protocol that secures only the route discovery
phase and not the data-forwarding phase. More-
over, we ﬁnd that SMT is successful in delivering
data with low end-to-end delay, low delay jitter,
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tocol that uses no message dispersion.
The secure single path (SSP) transmission pro-
tocol is the limiting case of SMT without the dis-
persion of outgoing messages and the use of a
single path for each message transmission. SSP is
equipped with the same end-to-end feedback and
the fault detection mechanisms as SMT. SSP also
retransmits each failed message Retrymax times,
provides data integrity, authenticity, and replay
protection as SMT does, and selects the shortest
path in hops. SSP switches to a new route, once the
selected route is deemed failed, and the links of the
failed route are removed from the topology view.
Both SMT and SSP are provided with the same
topology view. For all the experiments presented
here, an update topology viewðÞ process provides
the full picture of the network connectivity to the
source nodes, when one or more routes are needed.
This idealized route discovery incurs no delay and
no control overhead in acquiring the connectivity
information, and ensures that no stale routing in-
formation is utilized. 13 Various routing protocol
incur diﬀerent delays, routing and processing
overhead, and impose diﬀering constraints and
limitations on the SMT and SSP operation. To
isolate the performance of our protocols from the
underlying routing protocol and avoid such de-
pendencies on the underlying route discovery
phase, we made the decision to use the above
idealized route discovery mechanism. In the actual
implementation of SMT, instead of our topology
update primitive, diﬀerent secure routing protocols
among the ones presented in the literature
[1,2,5,24–26] could be employed. 14
For comparison purposes, we evaluate here
three protocols: (i) a single-path data forwarding
protocol that does not employ any security
mechanism to protect data transmissions, which
we term the non-secure single path (NSP) proto-
col, (ii) the SSP protocol, and (iii) the SMT pro-13 Unutilized links are ﬂushed when their age exceeds a
Max Link Age threshold; here Max Link Age ¼ 5:0 s.
14 Nevertheless, care should be taken in such a selection, as
some protocols could support single-path forwarding and
others multiple route discovery.tocol. In all the cases, we assume that the route
discovery is secured, that is, the correctness of the
discovered connectivity information is guaran-
teed. 15 We do not make any additional trust as-
sumptions beyond the end-to-end security
associations. Each source is securely associated
with one destination and sources transmit data to
the same destination throughout the simulated
period. For the simulation, we implemented
OPNETe models of the above protocols.
The network coverage area is a 1000 m · 1000 m
square with 50 mobile nodes, with any two nodes
able to communicate if they are within the recep-
tion distance, which is set to 300 m. The resultant
network topologies are bi-connected with high
probability; i.e., for any two nodes it is highly
likely that two node-disjoint paths exist [23]. The
nodes are initially uniformly distributed through-
out the network area and their movement is de-
termined by the random waypoint mobility model
[7]. The node speed is uniformly distributed be-
tween 1 and 20 m/s, and the pause times (PT) are 0,
20, 50, and 100 s, with the simulated time equal to
300 s. The supported data rate is 2 Mbps and 10
constant-bit-rate sources generate 4 messages/s
with packet payload of 64 bytes. We note that the
size of the buﬀer was not a limiting factor; i.e., no
packets were lost due to buﬀer overﬂow at the
source node. The medium access control protocol
models transmission, queuing, and propagation
delays and provides reliable communication at the
data link level. Each point on the presented graphs
corresponds to the average over 15 randomly
seeded runs and the number of adversarial nodes is
0, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 attackers.
Our model is equivalent to the model that the
attackers comply with the route discovery phase,
relaying all the route requests, replies, or route and
link state updates, in order to be placed on one or
more utilized routes. Once they become part of a
utilized route, attackers discard all data packets
forwarded across the route(s) they belong to. Ad-
versaries have the same features as the benign
nodes (mobility, reception range) and are not as-15 But, again, this does not imply paths that are free of
malicious nodes.
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parameters used for these experiments include
PGOAL ¼ 0:99, Retrymax ¼ 3, rthrs ¼ 0:0, rmaxs ¼ 1:0,
a ¼ 0:33, b ¼ 0:033.
The beneﬁt from the presence of securing the
data transmission is clearly shown in Fig. 3. In Fig.Fig. 3. Fraction of delivered messages: (a) SMT, (b) NSP, (c)
SSP.3(a), SMT delivers more than 99% of the trans-
mitted messages within the range of 5–15 adver-
saries and more than 95% of the packets even
when 50% of the nodes are malicious. Similar
performance (approximately 1–2% degradation
compared to SMT) is achieved by SSP, as shown
in Fig. 3(c). In contrast, the fast degradation of the
NSP protocol comes as no surprise, as shown in
Fig. 3(b). The improvement of SMT over NSP
ranges from 14% to 83% as the number of adver-
saries increases.
Without a mechanism that can detect malicious
faults, an NSP source can detect a compromised
route only if a link breakage is reported. This is
true for any reactive secure routing protocol that
does not secure the data transmission phase. In a
malicious setting, such feedback could reach the
source if it originated from a node at an upstream
position relative to the ﬁrst attacker lying on the
route. Fig. 4(b) veriﬁes the limitation of such a
mechanism, showing the average fraction of data
packets dropped at the adversaries over the total
number of transmitted packets from all the sour-
ces. Even a small fraction of adversaries can inﬂict
substantial packet loss: for example, with ﬁve ad-
versaries present (10% of the network nodes), NSP
experiences a loss of up to 17% of the transmitted
data. We reemphasize that NSP does not retrans-
mit data.
In contrast, the percentage of packets lost at the
adversaries when SMT or SSP is employed is sig-
niﬁcantly lower and increases at a much lower
rate. For SMT, it is 10% or less with 30% of ad-
versaries present and 20% or less even when 40%
of the network nodes disrupt the communication
(Fig. 4(a)). Comparatively, SSP allows lower loss
of data at the adversaries––6% of packets are
dropped with 30% of the nodes being adversaries,
and less than 11% when 40% of the nodes discard
data. This is mainly due to the fact that SMT in-
creases the dispersion factor and the number of
utilized routes, as the number of adversaries in-
crease. The higher the number of paths, the more
likely it is that compromised routes will be utilized
and thus adversaries will have the opportunity to
discard data. Nevertheless, due to the dispersion,
overall, such a loss is not harmful for SMT, as we
have seen in Fig. 3.
Fig. 5. End-to-end message delay: (a) SMT, (b) SSP.
Fig. 4. Percentage of data packets dropped by attackers: (a)
SMT, (b) NSP, (c) SSP.
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SSP is revealed by Fig. 5(a) and (b). Due to the
simultaneous usage of multiple routes, SMT
achieves lower end-to-end delays. The improve-
ment becomes more evident as the number of ad-
versaries increase. SMT yields up to 65% lower
end-to-end delays, as compared with SSP, when
the delays are calculated as the period from the
generation of a message at the transport/applica-tion layer until its successful delivery at the desti-
nation. Additionally, SMT provides signiﬁcantly
lower variability of the end-to-end delays; the
variance of the delay for SMT ranges from 5% to
80% lower than the end-to-end delay variance for
SSP. These two observations suggest that SMT is
more capable of supporting real-time traﬃc.
Finally, both SMT and SSP introduce trans-
mission overhead, due to the limited data re-
transmissions, the transmission of feedback, and
for the case of SMT, the message dispersion. Fig. 6
shows the average overhead calculated as the sum
of the transmitted message and the feedback pieces
over the number of successfully delivered mes-
sages. We observe that both SMT and SSP have a
trend of increasing transmission overhead as the
number of adversaries increase. SMT, due to the
simultaneous usage of multiple paths, incurs ad-
ditional overhead (Fig. 6(a)), ranging from 6% up
to 52% higher than the SSP overhead (Fig. 6(b)).
Such an increase is relatively small (i.e., not pro-
Fig. 6. Transmission overhead (TXOV). (a) SMT, (b) SSP.
16 The ‘‘router implementation’’ of IPsec would not make
sense within a MANET domain. Similarly, the ‘‘tunnel mode’’
will not be applicable, unless a master/slave association exists
(e.g., Bluetooth [12]), even though the dependent devices would
be practically invisible at the routing layer. Furthermore, the
ﬁxed infrastructure that provides the routing functionality and
the facilities for the distribution of IPsec policies is absent in
MANET.
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SMT eﬃciently trades bandwidth for delay.
SMT is eﬃcient due to the combination of
message dispersion and end-to-end feedback. It
does not simply replicate messages or transmit
redundant data. In our experiments, the average
size of the APS is ﬁve paths, with a standard de-
viation of 3.4 paths. The spread distribution of the
APS sizes implies that SMT operates with a low
number of paths for a signiﬁcant fraction of mes-
sage transmissions, without this undermining its
eﬀectiveness. However, the less adverse the envi-
ronment, the lower the fraction of available paths
that is utilized. Moreover, the higher the number
of adversaries, the more likely it is that one or
more of the APS paths will be discarded. As long
as message transmissions are successful, SMT op-
erates with the remaining available and smaller-
size APS.5. Related work
The protection of the traﬃc exchanged between
two communicating nodes has been a fertile area
of research outside the MANET community, with
the Internet security architecture (IPsec) being the
most prominent eﬀort [8–11]. Goals such as the
end-to-end authentication, integrity, and replay
protection apply equally to the MANET context
as well. However, the IPsec protocols, because
they assume the existence of a ﬁxed routing and
security infrastructure, are in general not applica-
ble to MANET. 16
Two transport layer protocols have features
that bear some resemblance to those of our
scheme, although there are fundamental diﬀer-
ences. It has been proposed to use the IDA algo-
rithm [3] to introduce redundancy, so that dropped
asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) cells would
not cause a TCP segment to be dropped [14].
However, in that work, no security services are
provided, there is no notion of multiple paths, and
the types of failures are radically diﬀerent than
those we study here. The second related protocol is
the stream control transport protocol (SCTP) [13];
it relies on the security services of IPsec and
identiﬁes multi-homed end-points using more than
one transport address. However, SCTP cannot be
applied in our malicious MANET context, as it
does not determine the actual routes. In fact,
SCTP data transmitted to diﬀerent addresses might
follow diﬀerent routes. Such an operation can be
harmful, since switching to a diﬀerent ‘‘path’’
(transport address) does not provide any assurance
that the actual multi-hop route will be diﬀerent.
Moreover, SCTP can be vulnerable to intermittent
attacks, with adversaries forwarding ‘‘heartbeats,’’
but dropping the actual packets.
17 For example, a transient loss can be caused due to
network impairments or due to an adversary that employs a
selective, intermittent attack pattern to avoid detection. Never-
theless, the route links may remain intact after such transient
failures.
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studied for the provision of QoS guarantees and
load balancing in wired networks. In MANET,
multiple paths have been utilized as a means to
tolerate path breakages due to mobility. One such
scheme proposes the use of diversity coding and
provides an approximation for the probability of
successful data transmission [6]. Another more
recent scheme proposes the collection of link
quality metrics, and the determination of a highly
reliable set of link-disjoint paths (as opposed to
node disjoint paths that we use here). The fast
determination of the path set yields long-lived path
sets that support communication with infrequent
interruptions [27]. None of the two above men-
tioned schemes provides security features or
mechanisms to assess the quality of utilized routes
in an end-to-end manner.
As for security solutions targeting MANET
data transmission, the use of multiple routes ex-
isting in multi-hop topologies has been proposed
in the early work of [28] and then in [1]. From a
diﬀerent perspective, it has been proposed to detect
misbehaving MANET nodes and report such
events to the rest of the network. All the network
nodes maintain a set of metrics reﬂecting the past
behavior of other nodes and then select routes
through relatively well-behaved nodes [15]. A more
recent work [20], makes the additional provision
that all nodes have a secure association with all
other network nodes. Thus, they can authenticate
the misbehavior reports they exchange with their
peers, seeking to detect and isolate malicious nodes
that do not forward data packets. Another method
to detect an attacker lying on the utilized route has
been proposed in [21]. Once the communication
across the route experiences a loss rate beyond a
tolerable threshold, the source node initiates a
search along the route to determine where the
failure occurred. To do so, an encrypted and au-
thenticated dialogue is initiated with each node
along the route, with all network nodes assumed
being securely associated with all their peers. Fi-
nally, a diﬀerent approach [16] provides incentive
to nodes, so that they comply with protocol rules
and properly relay user data. The assumed greedy
nodes forward packets in exchange for ﬁctitious
currency.6. Discussion and future work
In this work, we showed how the data-for-
warding phase can be secured by a protocol that
operates solely in an end-to-end manner, without
any further assumptions on the network trust and
behavior of the adversaries. In fact, SMT can
counter any attacker pattern, either persistent or
intermittent, by promptly detecting non-opera-
tional or compromised routes. Moreover, SMT
bounds the loss of data incurred by an intelligent
adversary that avoids detection through manipu-
lation of the path rating scheme. At the same time,
SMT provides robustness to benign network faults
as well, whether transient or not. The resilience to
transient faults is very important, as it avoids
discarding routes that are operational. 17 This re-
duces the unnecessary overhead. Furthermore,
resilience to benign faults, along with malicious
ones, is important, since in MANET they may be
frequent and in practice indistinguishable from
forms of denial-of-service attacks.
Fault tolerance is dependent on the ability of
the protocol to determine and utilize alternative,
new routes when it detects non-operational ones.
The multiplicity of routes that are, in general, ex-
pected to be available in MANET multi-hop to-
pologies can be clearly beneﬁcial. The availability
or timely determination of such redundant routes
may be the single most important factor for suc-
cessful transmission across an adverse network.
For example, both SMT and SSP achieve highly
reliable data delivery, despite their diﬀerent
methods of utilizing routes. Both of the protocols
have access to the same, in most cases, connec-
tivity information and thus an equally rich set of
routes. As a result, both protocols converge to the
non-compromised route(s) among many discov-
ered, if such route(s) exist at a particular instance.
A rich APS, or many alternative routes, can be
available only at the expense of routing overhead.
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protocol, even though the exact amount and type
of routing overhead depends on the employed
routing protocol. To increase the size of the APS,
one has to impose increased routing overhead,
which can be, in the case of reactive routing pro-
tocols, more frequent route requests and addi-
tional replies, or, in the case of proactive
protocols, more frequent link state updates.
However, by trading oﬀ higher routing overhead,
increased reliability (that is, higher fraction of
delivered messages) and lower delays can be
achieved.
In fact, the number of available diverse routes
appears to control the trade-oﬀ between the delay,
the routing and the transmission overhead, and the
fraction of delivered messages. For example, the
higher the size of the utilized APS, the more
probable the successful reconstruction of the dis-
persed message will be and, consequently, the
fewer the data retransmissions and, thus, the lower
the message delay.
An open issue of interest is how to obtain esti-
mates or predictions of the probability that a route
will be operational. The complexity of such a task
is increased, because of the numerous factors that
aﬀect the condition of the utilized routes. Mobility,
congestion, transmission impairments, and an ar-
bitrary, possibly intermittent and changing over
time attack pattern, have to be taken into con-
sideration.
Through its interaction with the network and
the feedback it obtains from the trusted destina-
tion, each node can gradually construct such es-
timates. Clearly, the network conditions and
characteristics can change over time. More simply,
parameters such as the network connectivity,
density, or the number of attackers present can
diﬀer according to the nodes neighborhood. In
any case, a feasible estimation method would be
able only to continuously track 18 such changes
and to provide rough estimates.
A plausible approach would be to collect sta-
tistics on the lifetimes of all the utilized routes,
with the lifetime deﬁned as the period from the18 Rather than determine from ‘‘cold’’.determination of a route till the route is deemed
failed. It would be helpful to categorize routes
according to attributes such as the length, or
whether the route includes any additional trusted
nodes, other than the destination. Moreover, it
would be more meaningful to update such mea-
surements by assigning a lower weight to earlier
observations in order to account for the network
dynamics. For example, a node could quantize
path lifetimes and retain measurements and esti-
mates for a set of intervals. In addition, maintain
one set of such measurements for each category of
paths of length i. Then, if a (newly determined)
path of length i has been operational for a period t
in the [tx, txþ1] interval, the node utilizes the esti-
mate of the probability that such a path will sur-
vive for a period t0 > t, with t0 in the [txþ1, txþ2]
interval. The investigation and evaluation of such
mechanisms are left as future work.7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented the SMT
protocol to secure the data forwarding operation
for MANET routing protocols. Our protocol
takes advantage of topological and transmission
redundancies and utilizes feedback, exchanged
only between the two communicating end-nodes.
This way, SMT remains eﬀective even under
highly adverse conditions. Moreover, features
such as low-cost encoding and validation mech-
anisms, and partial retransmissions render the
scheme eﬃcient. By relying solely on the end-
to-end security associations, SMT can secure
eﬀectively the data transmission without prior
knowledge of the network trust model or the
degree of trustworthiness of the intermediate
nodes. In addition, secure transmissions can be
achieved with low overhead in terms of the
transmitted data, while SMT can operate eﬀec-
tively even when it utilizes a low number of APS
paths. Consequently, SMT can be beneﬁcial in
low-connectivity topologies as well.
Our performance evaluation conﬁrms that SMT
can naturally complement protocols that secures
the route discovery and can shield the network
operation from adversarial behavior by delivering
208 P. Papadimitratos, Z.J. Haas / Ad Hoc Networks 1 (2003) 193–209up to 83% more data packets, as compared with
protocols that lack the secure data transmission
feature. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that SMT can re-
duce the end-to-end delay and the variation of
delays up to 65% and 80%, respectively, compared
with a single-path secure data forwarding proto-
col. These ﬁndings suggest that SMT is more ca-
pable to support real-time traﬃc in adverse
MANET environments. In conclusion, SMTs low
overhead and its eﬃcient and eﬀective operation
render SMT applicable to a wide range of MA-
NET instances. The highly successful delivery of
messages, in spite of the presence of adversaries
and, most importantly, the low end-to-end delay
clues on the ability of the protocol to support QoS
for real-time traﬃc in MANET.Acknowledgements
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